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Abstract
A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every
stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether
to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive
some terminal payoﬀ.
We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players
are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game termi-
nates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than
one.
We prove that a subgame-perfect -equilibrium in Markovian strate-
gies exists. If the game is not degenerate this -equilibrium is actually
in pure strategies.
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11 Introduction
Dynkin (1969) introduced the following zero-sum game of optimal stopping.
The game involves two players, and two stochastic processes: (in)n∈N is a
{1,2}-valued process, which indicates which player is active at stage n, and
(rn)n∈N is a R2-valued process, which indicates the terminal payoﬀ.
At every stage n, the two players are informed of past and current values
of the two processes. Player in, the active player at stage n, decides whether
he continues or stops. The game stops at the ﬁrst stage θ in which the active
player chooses to stop. The payoﬀ (paid by player 2 to player 1) is rθ if
θ < +∞ and zero otherwise. A pure strategy of player i is a stopping time
that is consistent with the rules of the game.
Dynkin proved that this game has a value if supn∈N |rn| ∈ L1, and con-
structed pure -optimal strategies for the two players. Dynkin’s -optimal
strategies are subgame-perfect in the sense that after every ﬁnite history, the
continuation strategy is -optimal in the subgame deﬁned by that history.
An extensive literature developed from this seminal work. In a discrete
time framework, much attention was paid to the case where the players are
allowed to stop simultaneously. In the zero-sum case, several authors, in-
cluding Kiefer (1971) and Neveu (1975), provided suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of the value, when players are restricted to stopping times.
Rosenberg et al. (2001) proved (under a minimal boundedness condition)
that the value always exists, provided the players are allowed to use random-
ized stopping times. In the two-player non-zero-sum case, Shmaya and Solan
(2002) proved that an ε-equilibrium always exists in randomized stopping
times (again, under some boundedness condition).
Dynkin’s (1969) result implies that in every multi-player Dynkin game
(without simultaneous moves) an ε-equilibrium exists. Indeed, let σi be a
pure ε-optimal strategy of player i in the zero-sum game in which player i
maximizes his expected payoﬀ, and all other players try to minimize player
i’s payoﬀ. Let σ
−i
i be a pure ε-optimal strategy of i’s opponents in this
game. One can verify that the strategy proﬁle in which each player i follows
σi until a deviation occurs (since each σi is pure, a deviation is detected
immediately), and upon deviation of player j all his opponents switch to
σ
−j
j , is a 2ε-equilibrium.
The model of multi-player Dynkin games oﬀers a stylized framework to
analyze various issues of timing games. For example, in situations of shrink-
ing markets (see, e.g., Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985), Fine and Li (1989)),
2n ﬁrms have to decide when to exit a shrinking market. Once a ﬁrm exits,
we remain with a market with n − 1 ﬁrms, which can be solved inductively,
hence the overall game reduces to a Dynkin game.
A similar situation occurs in takeover games, where n ﬁrms strategically
decide to make a takeover attempt on opponent ﬁrms.
Another related model is that of multi-player duels, or n-uels (see, e.g.,
Kilgour (1975, 1977) or Kilgour and Brams (1997)). In this model, n gunners
alternately have the option to shoot one of their opponents or to abstain.
Since once a gunner hits one of his opponents we are left with a game with
n−1 players, which can be solved inductively, the game is essentially reduced
to a Dynkin game where players have several stop actions.
As the ε-equilibrium we presented above involves threats of punishment,
which might be non-credible, it is desirable to know whether a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0. To this day, it is still not known
whether every multi-player Dynkin game has an ε-equilibrium.
When |I| = 2, the proof of Shmaya and Solan (2002) can be used to
show the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. Solan (2002) uses
the theory of diﬀerential inclusions to prove the existence of a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium when (i) the sequence (in) is i.i.d., and (ii) rn depends
only on in (so that the terminal payoﬀ depends only on the identity of the
player who terminates the game.)
In the present paper we analyze the following class of I-player games. A
deterministic sequence (in,pn,rn) ∈ I × [0,1] × RI is given. At each stage
n player in chooses whether to continue or to stop. If he continues, the
game continues to the next stage, while if he stops a lottery is performed.
With probability pn the game terminates, yielding the payoﬀ rn, while with
probability 1 − pn the game continues.
The assumption that the order of players is deterministic is restrictive
but sometimes relevant. On the other hand, allowing the probability of
termination to be strictly less than one is quite natural: a takeover attempt
is not always successful, and the accuracy of a gunner is not always perfect.
Our main result states that if the sequence (rn) of payoﬀs is bounded, a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. Moreover, un-
less the game is degenerate, this ε-equilibrium is in pure strategies. However,
in degenerate cases, a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium need not exist. Since
the subgame-perfect -equilibrium we identify is in Markovian strategies, it
is robust to the information players receive along the game; all they need to
know is the stage of the game. Translated to the n-uel model, this means
3that there is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium which is also a subgame-perfect
-equilibrium in the silent n-uel, in which players do not observe missed shots.
In degenerate cases, there need not be subgame-perfect ε-equilibria in
pure strategies. This is to be contrasted with (i) ﬁnite games of perfect
information and (ii) two-player zero-sum Dynkin games, where a subgame
perfect (ε-) equilibrium in pure strategies always exists.
We hope that the combination of the arguments we use here with the
techniques presented by Shmaya and Solan (2002) and Solan (2002) can be
used to further study multi-player Dynkin games.
Another motivation to our study is linked to the observation that deter-
ministic Dynkin games form a simple class of stochastic games. By now, some
results are available on the existence of equilibrium payoﬀs in multi-player
stochastic games, see Solan (1999) and Vieille (2000). By contrast, apart
from few classes of games, there are no results on the existence of subgame-
perfect equilibrium payoﬀs and useful techniques are yet to be found. We
hope that this paper will contribute to this emerging literature.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
the main result. Several examples appear in Section 3. The proof of the
main result appears in Section 4.
2 The Model and the Main Result
2.1 Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games
A deterministic multi-player Dynkin game Γ = (I,(in,pn,rn)n∈N) is given by
• A ﬁnite set I of players.
• For every n ∈ N, a triplet (in,pn,rn) ∈ I × [0,1] × RI.
The triplet (in,pn,rn) speciﬁes who is allowed to stop at stage n, the proba-
bility that the game terminates if player in decides to stop, and the terminal
payoﬀ if the game terminates at stage n, respectively.
The game is played in stages. At each stage n ∈ N, provided the game has
not terminated yet, player in has to choose whether to Continue or Stop. If he
decides to continue, the game continues to stage n+1. If he decides to stop,
a lottery takes place (all lotteries in the game, including random choices by
the players, are independent.) With probability pn the game terminates, and
4the terminal payoﬀ for the players is given by the vector rn. With probability
1 − pn the game continues to stage n + 1. If the game never terminates, the
payoﬀ is zero for all players.1
We denote by θ the termination stage of the game, i.e., the ﬁrst stage in
which a player decides to stop and the game terminates. Thus, the payoﬀ to
player i ∈ I is ri
θ1θ<∞.
2.2 Strategies and results
A strategy of player i ∈ I maps the set of information sets of player i to the
set of mixed moves of player i. We let Ni = {n ∈ N | in = i} be the set of
stages in which player i is active.
We are going to restrict the players to Markovian strategies; namely,
strategies that depend only on the stage, and not on the history. We will
prove below that the game admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Marko-
vian strategies. By a general observation (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, p.501)), this subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium remains a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium without the restriction to Markovian strategies.
In the present context, a (behavior Markovian) strategy of player i is a
function σi : Ni → [0,1], where σi(n) is the probability assigned by player i
to stop at stage n, provided the game does not terminate before that stage.
We denote the set of strategies of player i by Σi.
A strategy proﬁle (or simply a proﬁle) is a vector σ = (σi)i∈I of strategies,
one for each player.
Every strategy proﬁle σ ∈ ×i∈IΣi induces a probability distribution Pσ
over the space of plays, or inﬁnite histories. The corresponding expectation






Before we state our result, we ﬁrst recall standard equilibrium notions.
Deﬁnition 1 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ is an ε-equilibrium if for every






1Equivalently, we may assume that, with probability pn, player in is given the op-
portunity to stop for sure. For each strategy proﬁle, the payoﬀ is the same under both
interpretations of the game.
5We mention that, for any ε0 > ε, an ε-equilibrium is a uniform ε0-equilibrium;
that is, it is an ε0-equilibrium (a) in every discounted game, provided the
discount factor is suﬃciently small, and (b) in every N-stage game, provided
N is suﬃciently large. Indeed, the proof provided in Solan and Vieille (2001,
Proposition 2.13) does adapt to the present framework.
For n ∈ N, we denote by γn(σ) the expected payoﬀ induced by the
strategy proﬁle σ in the subgame starting at stage n.
A strategy proﬁle is a subgame-perfect (ε-)equilibrium of a game if it
induces an (ε-)equilibrium in any subgame. In the present context, this
amounts to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium








Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = (I,(in,pn,rn)n∈N) be a deterministic Dynkin game. If
the sequence (rn)n∈N is bounded, then for every ε > 0 the game Γ admits a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies.
We conclude this section with two comments.
As will be clear from the proof, in most cases, there is a pure subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium. However, this is not always true (see Example 3 be-
low). This is in sharp contrast with ﬁnite extensive games of perfect infor-
mation and with two-player zero-sum Dynkin games.
Our proof is valid as long as γ(σ) is uniformly bounded, for every proﬁle
σ (which is the case when the sequence (rn)n∈N is bounded.) If this does not
hold, there are strategies σ such that the corresponding payoﬀ for at least one
player is inﬁnite, so that the payoﬀ function of the game is not well-deﬁned.
3 Examples
In the present section we provide several examples, that illustrate the main
features of the model.





(1,1,(1,0,3)) n = 1 modulo 3,
(2,1,(3,1,0)) n = 2 modulo 3,
(3,1,(0,3,1)) n = 0 modulo 3.
6In words, at the ﬁrst stage, player 1 can stop the game, thereby yielding
the payoﬀ vector (1,0,3). If player 1 chooses to continue, at the second
stage player 2 can stop the game, yielding the terminal payoﬀ (3,1,0). If
player 2 chooses to continue as well, at the third stage player 3 can stop the
game, yielding the terminal payoﬀ (0,3,1). The process then repeats itself
cyclically. This game is a variation upon a game studied by Flesch et al.
(1997).
We will characterize all pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium proﬁles of
that game, using backward induction.
Let σ be such a 0-equilibrium. Assume that at stage 3n, for some n ≥ 2,
player 3 stops with probability 1; that is, σ3(3n) = 1. In particular, γ3n(σ) =
(0,3,1).
Consider the subgame starting at stage 3n − 1. In that subgame, player
2 receives γ2
3n(σ) = 3 if he chooses to continue at stage 3n − 1, while he
receives only 1 if he chooses to stop. By the subgame-perfect equilibrium
condition, player 2 continues at stage 3n−1, that is, σ2(3n−1) = 0. Hence
γ3n−1(σ) = γ3n(σ) = (0,3,1).
We repeat this argument with the subgame starting at stage 3n − 2. By
continuing at stage 3n − 2 player 1 receives 0, as the game will be termi-
nated at stage 3n, while by stopping he receives 1. By the subgame-perfect
equilibrium condition, σ1(3n − 2) = 1 and γ3n−2(σ) = (1,0,3).
Applying this backward induction argument repeatedly, we get that σ3(3n−
3) = 0, σ2(3n − 4) = 1, σ1(3n − 5) = 0 and σ3(3n − 6) = 1. The cycle of
length 6 then repeats itself.
On the other hand, if σ3(3n) = 0 for some n ≥ 2, then σ3(3n − 3) = 1
and the previous analysis holds.
Thus, there are two pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibria: (a) at odd stages
the active player stops, and at even stages the active player continues, and
(b) at even stages the active player stops, and at odd stages the active player
continues.
In each pure equilibrium, the players agree on who shoots ﬁrst. We believe
that the interpretation of these two equilibria is quite appealing: Suppose
there are three gunners. If gunner 1 thinks that gunner 2 is going to shoot
tomorrow gunner 3 (or gunner 1 if gunner 3 is already dead), he has no reason
to shoot today: he is better oﬀ by letting gunner 2 be done with gunner 3,
and shoot gunner 2 the next time he can. On the other hand, if gunner 1
thinks that gunner 2 is not going to shoot tomorrow if gunner 3 is still alive,
but shoot gunner 1 if gunner 3 is already dead, and that gunner 3 is going to
7shoot him the day after, he is indiﬀerent between shooting and not shooting
gunner 2, as he is going to die anyway, so he can as well shoot gunner 2
today.
Remark 4 This game admits other subgame-perfect equilibria. In partic-
ular, the proﬁle in which each player stops with probability 1/2 whenever
active, is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In a sense, it corresponds to the
cyclic equilibrium constructed by Flesch et al. (1997).
In the next example, we allow for probabilities of success below one.
Example 2: Consider the following modiﬁcation of Example 1, where





(1,1,(1,0,3)) n = 1 modulo 3,
(2,1/2,(3,1,0)) n = 2 modulo 3,
(3,1/2,(0,3,1)) n = 0 modulo 3.
Thus, when player 1 stops the game terminates with probability 1, while
when either player 2 or player 3 stops the game terminates with probability
1/2.
As we did in Example 1, we characterize the set of subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium in pure strategies. Let σ be such a strategy proﬁle. Let n > 0
and i be the active player at stage n. By the subgame-perfect equilibrium
condition, σi(n) = 1 if γi
n+1(σ) < 1 and σi(n) = 0 if γi
n+1(σ) > 1.
Let n ≥ 3, and assume that σ1(3n + 1) = 1. Then γ3n+1(σ) = (1,0,3),
and therefore σ3(3n) = 0. This implies that γ3n(σ) = γ3n+1(σ) = (1,0,3),





























































































and therefore σ2(3n − 10) = 0, and σ1(3n − 11) = 1.
Therefore, any pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium must repeat the se-
quence of actions (starting with player 1) (S,C,S;C,C,S;C,S,C;C,S,C). Along
this cycle, player 1 ﬁrst stops, then player 3 stops twice in a row, then player 2
stops twice in a row. This diﬀerence with the subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium
of Example 1 arises since the probability of termination is here below one.
By further decreasing the probabilities pn for n = 2 or 3 mod3, while keep-
ing pn = 1 for n = 1 mod 3, one can create examples in which all pure
subgame-perfect equilibria have cycles of arbitrary length.
This example highlights one eﬀect of low values for (pn). Note indeed that
the expected payoﬀ, starting from some stage n, is a convex combination of
rn and of the continuation payoﬀ (the expected payoﬀ, starting from stage
n+1). The weight of rn depends on the probability of termination, but cannot
exceed pn. In particular, when the probability of termination is low, the
expected payoﬀ is close to the continuation payoﬀ. Therefore, if some player
has an incentive to stop only once the continuation payoﬀ reaches a certain
threshold, many stages may be required so that this threshold is reached.
Thus, if the game has a periodic equilibrium, lowering the probabilities of
termination often results in periodic equilibria with longer and longer periods.
We next introduce a two-player game that has no subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium and no pure subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium.
Example 3: Take I = {1,2}, and
(in,pn,rn) =
(
(1,1,(−1,2)) n is odd,
(2,1,(−2,1)) n is even.
Fix ε ∈ (0,1), and let σ be the strategy proﬁle deﬁned by σ1(2n+1) = 1
and σ2(2n + 2) = ε for every n ≥ 0. We claim that σ is a subgame-perfect
9ε-equilibrium. One should verify that player 1 (resp. player 2) cannot proﬁt
by deviating in the subgames that start at odd (resp. even) stages. Consider
ﬁrst the subgame that starts at stage 2n + 1, for some n ≥ 0. By stopping
at stage 2n + 1 player 1 receives −1, while, since player 2 eventually stops
with probability 1, player 1’s payoﬀ is at most −1, whatever he plays. In
the subgame starting at stage 2n + 2, player 2’s expected payoﬀ under σ is
ε + 2(1 − ε) = 2 − ε, whereas the maximal payoﬀ to player 2 in the game is
2.
We next prove that the game has no subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in
pure strategies. Assume to the contrary that there exists such a proﬁle σ.
We ﬁrst claim that there is an inﬁnite set of even stages in which player
2 chooses to stop. Otherwise, let N be the maximal integer such that player
2 stops at stage 2N (set N = 0 if player 2 never stops). Consider now
the subgame that starts at stage 2N + 2. By the deﬁnition of N, player
2 never stops in this subgame. Since σ is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium,
this implies that under σ player 1 never stops in this subgame: by never
stopping he receives 0, while by stopping he receives −1. But this leads to a
contradiction, as it implies that player 2 can proﬁt 1 by deviating: by never
stopping he receives 0, while by stopping he receives 1.
We next claim that there is at most one even stage in which player 2
chooses to stop. Together with the previous paragraph, this shows that there
cannot be a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. Assume that player 2 stops at
stage 2N, with N > 1. Since σ induces an ε-equilibrium in the subgame that
starts at stage 2N −1, and since player 2 stops at stage 2N, under σ player 1
stops at stage 2N −1. However, since player 1 stops at stage 2N −1, under
σ player 2 continues in all stages 2k for k < N: by continuing in all these
stages he receives 2, while his payoﬀ upon stopping is 1.
This example shows that pure subgame-perfect ε-equilibria need not exist.
Such a case may arise when there is a player i who by stopping gives everyone
else high payoﬀ, but he himself receives low payoﬀ. It is then in the interest
of his opponents to threaten him that if he does not stop, one of them will
eventually stop and punish player i. The punisher, however, stops with low
probability, so that player i has a chance to correct his behavior and stop
the game at a later stage.
We ﬁnally prove that there is no subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. We
argue by contradiction, and we let σ be a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. For
10i = 1,2, we denote by ci the strategy that always continues, i.e., ci(n) = 0
for each n ∈ Ni. Note ﬁrst that, for each n ∈ N, one has
Pσ(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1. (1)
Indeed, the sequence (Pσ(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n))n∈N would otherwise decrease
to zero, hence the sequence (γn(σ))n∈N would converge to zero, and player 2
would have a proﬁtable deviation in the subgame starting at stage n, for n
large enough. By (1) the game terminates with probability 1, hence at least
one of the players eventually stops with probability 1:
Pσ1,c2(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for each n ∈ N, or (2)
Pc1,σ2(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for each n ∈ N. (3)
If (2) holds, then c2 is the best reply to σ1 in all subgames, hence σ2 = c2.
Since the unique best reply of player 1 to c2 is c1, one gets σ = (c1,c2) – a
contradiction to (1).
If (3) holds, there are inﬁnitely many even integers n such that σ2(n) > 0.
By optimality of σ1, and since (3) holds, one has σ1(n − 1) = 1 for any such
n. Therefore, (2) holds – a contradiction.
4 The Proof of Theorem 3
In the present section we prove Theorem 3.
4.1 Preliminaries
In this subsection, we analyze few degenerate cases, and slightly rephrase the
problem. The core of the proof of Theorem 3 is in subsection 4.4.
Let Γ = (I,(in,pn,rn)n∈N) be a deterministic Dynkin game. Since the se-
quence (rn)n∈N is bounded, we can assume w.l.o.g. that payoﬀs are bounded
by 1.
Let ˜ Γ = (I,(in,pn, ˜ rn)n∈N) be another game with the same sequence
of active players and the same probabilities of success. Since the payoﬀ
functions of the two games diﬀer by at most supn∈N krn−˜ rnk, any subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium of ˜ Γ is a subgame-perfect ε0-equilibrium of Γ, where
ε0 = ε + supn∈N krn − ˜ rnk.
11Since we are looking for an ε-equilibrium, and since payoﬀs are bounded,
there is no loss of generality in assuming that the range of the sequence
(rn)n∈N is ﬁnite, and that if (i,r) and (j, ˜ r) are two distinct elements in that
range then rk 6= ˜ rk for every k ∈ I.
Notice now that Theorem 3 will follow if we prove that there is a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium in some subgame of Γ. Indeed, the conclusion for Γ
will then follow by applying backward induction to the ﬁrst stages of the
game. Moreover, since ﬁnite extensive games with perfect information have
pure subgame-perfect equilibria, the resulting proﬁle will be pure when the
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium of the subgame is pure.




{pn | n ∈ N,(in,rn) = (i,r)}
and set IR∞ = {(i,r) ∈ IR | π(i,r) = +∞}. If π(i,r) = +∞ then if player
i stops whenever (in,rn) = (i,r), and all players continue in all other stages,
the game will eventually terminate, and the terminal payoﬀ will be r.
We now argue that we may assume w.l.o.g. that
π(i,r) = +∞ for each (i,r) ∈ IR. (4)
As a ﬁrst step, we prove that we may assume w.l.o.g. that
π(i,r) = 0 for each (i,r) / ∈ IR∞. (5)
Choose ﬁrst N ∈ N large enough such that
X
n≥N:(in,rn)=(i,r)
pn < ε/|IR| for each (i,r) / ∈ IR∞. (6)
Such an N exists since IR is a ﬁnite set. Denote by ΓN the subgame that
starts at stage N. Let ˜ ΓN = (I,(in, ˜ pn,rn)n∈N) be the game that coincides
with ΓN except that ˜ pn = 0 whenever (˜ in, ˜ rn) / ∈ IR∞.
By (6), the payoﬀ functions of the two games ΓN and ˜ ΓN diﬀer by at most
2ε. Therefore, any subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium of ˜ ΓN is a subgame-perfect
3ε-equilibrium of ΓN, and, by backward induction, yields a subgame-perfect
3ε-equilibrium of Γ.
As the game ˜ ΓN satisﬁes (5), one can assume w.l.o.g. that (5) holds.
12Thus, we are led to analyze games such that, for each (i,r) ∈ IR, either
π(i,r) = 0 or π(i,r) = +∞. If π(i,r) = 0 for each (i,r) ∈ IR (so that IR∞ =
∅), the payoﬀ function of the game is identically zero and the conclusion of
Theorem 3 follows trivially.
Assume now that IR∞ 6= ∅. Consider the game obtained by dropping all
stages n such that π(in,rn) = 0 (and by relabeling stages). Since there are
inﬁnitely many stages n such that π(in,rn) = +∞, the resulting game is again
a deterministic multi-player Dynkin game. Plainly, any subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium of this new game is also a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium of the
initial game (with the proper identiﬁcation of stages, and with an arbitrary
behavior in the stages that have been dropped).
It follows that we can assume w.l.o.g. that (4) holds.
4.2 A partition into blocks
In the present section, we ﬁx ε < 1/40. Given ε, we deﬁne a partition of the
set N of stages into blocks. This partition will be used in the sequel to prove
Theorem 3.
We will use the following technical result.
Lemma 5 (Rosenberg et al, 2002, Lemma 18) Let n ∈ N, and let p1,...,pn
be non-negative reals that satisfy
Pn





















j=1(1 − pj) is the probability that the result of at
least one out of n coins with parameters p1,...,pn is Head. In particular it
is equal to 1 −
Qn
i=1(1 − pi).
Corollary 6 Let ε < 1/40, n ∈ N, and p1,...,pn be non-negative reals that
satisfy
Pn




j=1(1 − pj) ≥ ε/2.
Proof. The proof is divided into three cases.
If
Pn
i=1 pi ≤ 1/20 the claim follows from Lemma 5 and since ε < 1/40.
If there is i such that pi ≥ ε the claim holds trivially.









(1 − pj) = 1 −
n Y
i=1












≥ ε − 20ε
2 ≥ ε/2,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 5, and the third one holds
since the function x − 20x2 is monotonic decreasing for x < 1/20 and since
ε < 1/40.
We are now ready to deﬁne the partition of N into blocks. Set n0 = 1
and, for l ∈ N, deﬁne the initial stage nl of block l to be
nl = min{n > nl−1 |
X
nl−1≤k<n,(ik,rk)=(i,r)
pk ≥  ∀(i,r) ∈ IR}.
Since π(i,r) = +∞ for each (i,r) ∈ IR, all nl, l ∈ N, are ﬁnite.
By Corollary 6, in each block all players have a probability at least ε/2
to terminate the game with any vector they choose.
4.3 A simple case
Under the assumption that π(i,r) = +∞ for each (i,r) ∈ IR, the proof
proceeds by induction over the number of elements in IR. The conclusion is
easy if |IR| = 1, and is left to the reader.
We now analyze a somewhat degenerate case that generalizes Example 2.
This is the only place in the proof where we use the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 7 Assume that there exists (i,r) ∈ IR such that
r
j ≥ ˜ r
j for every (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR.
Then for each ε > 0 there is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium.
The lemma states that if there is a terminal payoﬀ r that is preferred by
each player i to all terminal payoﬀs i controls, then a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium exists.
14Proof. We assume w.l.o.g. that ε < 1/40, and we split the discussion
into three cases.
Case 1: ri ≥ 0.
Let σ be the pure strategy proﬁle in which player i stops whenever (in,rn) =
(i,r), and all players continue in all other stages, i.e.,
σ
in(n) = 1 if and only if (in,rn) = (i,r).
Fix n ∈ N. We prove that σ induces a 0-equilibrium in the subgame
that starts at stage n. Since π(i,r) = +∞, the game eventually terminates,
and therefore the expected payoﬀ is r. Player i cannot gain by deviating,
since his payoﬀ is at most ri if he terminates the game, and 0 ≤ ri if he
always continues. Every player j 6= i cannot gain by deviating either, since
his payoﬀ under σ is rj, while if he deviates his payoﬀ is in the convex hull
of rj and {˜ rj,(j, ˜ r) ∈ IR}, hence at most rj.
Case 2: ri < 0, and there is (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR such that i 6= j and ˜ ri < ri.
In this case, we elaborate upon the construction in Example 3. We will
have player i stop at all stages in {n ∈ N : (in,rn) = (i,r)}, and player j
stop with some small probability at stages in {n ∈ N : (in,rn) = (j, ˜ r)}. The
choices of the corresponding probabilities should fulﬁll two conditions: (i)
these values should be small enough so that kγn(σ)−rk < ε, for each n ∈ N
and (ii) they should be high enough so that, if player i were to continue at
all stages, the game would still stop a.s. in ﬁnite time. These two conditions
relate to the two dual aspects of the threat. By condition (i) the threat will
be used on the equilibrium path with small probability. By condition (ii) it
will provide incentives to player i to act as required.
Recall the partition of N into blocks that was deﬁned in Section 4.2, and
that nl is the ﬁrst stage of block l, l ≥ 0.
Since for every l ≥ 0 one has
P
nl≤n<nl+1:(in,rn)=(j,˜ r) pn ≥ ε, there is a func-
tion x : N → [0,1] such that for every l ≥ 0 one has
P
nl≤n<nl+1:(in,rn)=(j,˜ r) xnpn =
ε2.
We let σ be the strategy proﬁle in which player i stops whenever (in,rn) =
(i,r), player j stops with probability xn whenever (in,rn) = (j, ˜ r), and all






1 if (in,rn) = (i,r),
xn if (in,rn) = (j, ˜ r),
0 otherwise.
15We prove that σ is a subgame-perfect 2ε-equilibrium. Let n ∈ N and
consider the subgame that starts at stage n.
The deﬁnition of σ, Lemma 5 and Corollary 6 imply that (a) the proba-
bility that player i stops under σ in each block l, conditioned that the game
reaches stage nl, is at least (1 − ε2)ε/2, and (b) the probability that player
j stops under σ in each block l, conditioned that the game reaches stage nl,
is between (1 − ε)ε2/2 and ε2.
This implies that kγn(σ)−rk ≤ 2ε. Furthermore, (a) and (b) imply that
under any unilateral deviation the game terminates with probability one.
Since for every player k and every (k,r0) ∈ IR one has r0k ≤ rk ≤
γk
n(σ) + 2ε, no player k 6= i can proﬁt more than 2ε by deviating from σ in
the subgame that starts at stage n. Since ˜ ri ≤ ri ≤ γi
n(σ) + 2ε, the same
applies to player i.
Case 3: ri < 0, and ˜ ri ≥ ri for every (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR with i 6= j.
In that case, by the assumption of the lemma, the strategy of player i
that always continues is a weakly dominant strategy.
Consider the modiﬁed game where one sets pn = 0 whenever in = i, or,
alternatively, one drops all stages in which in = i. Note that player i is a
dummy in the modiﬁed game.
By the induction hypothesis, the modiﬁed game admits a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium σ0. Extend σ0 to a proﬁle σ in the original game, by instruct-
ing player i to continue at all stages n. Then σ is a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium.
4.4 The general case
In view of Lemma 7, Theorem 3 will follow from Proposition 8 below.
Proposition 8 Let Γ be a deterministic multi-player Dynkin game. Assume
that for every (i,r) ∈ IR, (i) π(i,r) = +∞, and (ii) there is (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR such
that ˜ rj > rj. Then, for every ε > 0, the game Γ has a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium in pure Markovian strategies.
Note that Example 3 does not ﬁt into Proposition 8. We do not know
whether a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium exists or not. The rest of this sec-
tion is devoted to the proof of the proposition.
As remarked at the beginning of Section 4.1, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
for every (i,r),(j, ˜ r) ∈ IR, either (i,r) = (j, ˜ r), or rk 6= ˜ rk for every k.
16For every i ∈ I set
m
i = max{r
i | (i,r) ∈ IR}.
This is the maximal terminal payoﬀ player i can receive when stopping alone.
Let ρi ∈ RI be the unique vector r such that (i,r) ∈ IR and ri = mi
(uniqueness is guaranteed by the preceding paragraph).
Finally, set
W = {w ∈ R
N | w
i ≤ m
i for some i ∈ I}.
This is the set of all payoﬀ vectors w such that at least one player is better
oﬀ by stopping at some stage rather than continuing forever and receiving
w.
An important property of the set W is that if the continuation payoﬀ
at stage n is w ∈ W, and if player in prefers to stop rather than continue
(that is, win ≤ rin
n ), then the expected payoﬀ if player in stops at stage n,
(1 − pn)w + pnrn, is in W. Formally, for every n ∈ N,
w ∈ W and w
in ≤ r
in
n imply (1 − pn)w + pnrn ∈ W. (7)
Indeed, under the assumptions, (1 − pn)win + pnrin
n ≤ rin
n ≤ min, and (7)
follows.
We will prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. We as-
sume w.l.o.g. that ε < 1/40, and that furthermore ε < 1
2 min(i,r)6=(j,˜ r) |ri−˜ ri|.
Let l ∈ N be given. We will deﬁne a pure proﬁle σl up to stage nl. We will
simultaneously construct a sequence (wl(n))
nl
n=1 of vectors in W. As a ﬁrst
approximation, the vector wl(n) may be interpreted as the expected payoﬀ
under σ from stage n onwards.
As for now, we ﬁx l ∈ N and we write σ and w instead of σl and wl
respectively.
We deﬁne both σ and w backwards. We let w(nl) be an arbitrary point
in W ∩ [−1,1]I. We deal with each of the blocks inductively (starting with
the lth one). Let k ≤ l. Assuming w(nk) ∈ W is already deﬁned, we deﬁne
now σ and w over the stages n = nk−1,...,nk − 1.
Given w(n+1) and σin(n), we set w(n) = σin(n)pnrn+(1−σin(n)pn)w(n+
1), so that we need only deﬁne σin(n). Thus, if w(n+1) is the expected payoﬀ
from stage n+1 onwards, w(n) is the expected payoﬀ from stage n onwards.
17We will deﬁne σin(n) such that (i) σin(n) is pure, and (ii) σin(n) = 1 implies
rin
n ≥ win(n + 1). Since w(nl) ∈ W and by (7), this implies that w(n) ∈ W
for every n ≤ nl.
Case 1 wi(nk) ≤ mi −  for some i ∈ I.
We deﬁne σ by backward induction, with an appropriate tie-breaking
rule. Set σin(n) = 1 if rin
n ≥ win(n + 1), and σin(n) = 0 otherwise.
Thus, at stage n, player in compares his continuation payoﬀ win(n+1) to
the payoﬀ rin
n he would get by stopping, and he continues or stops accordingly.
Case 2 wi(nk) > mi −  for each i ∈ I.
Fix i∗ ∈ I such that wi∗(nk) ≤ mi∗. Since w(nk) ∈ W, such a player
exists. We will deﬁne σ so that at the ﬁnal stages of the block only player
i∗ will possibly stop. In earlier stages, σ will be deﬁned using backward
induction as in Case 1.
Formally, let nk−1 ≤ n < nk. Assume that σ has been deﬁned for stages
q = n+1,...,nk−1. We deﬁne σ at stage n as follows. Denote by π(n+1,nk)
the probability under σ that, starting from stage n+1, the game terminates
under σ before stage nk, i.e.,
π(nk,nk) = 0, and π(q,nk) = σ
iq(q)pq+(1−σ
iq(q))π(q+1,nk) for n+1 ≤ q < nk.
Then:
• if π(n + 1,nk) < ε, we set σin(n) = 1 if both in = i∗ and ri∗
n ≥ wi∗(n)
hold. We set σin(n) = 0 otherwise;
• if π(n + 1,nk) ≥ ε, we set σin(n) = 1 if rin
n ≥ win(n), and σin(n) = 0
otherwise.
We now prove that under σ, the probability of termination in any single
block is bounded away from zero.
Lemma 9 For each k such that 0 ≤ k < l, one has
Pσ(θ < nk+1 | θ ≥ nk) ≥ ε/3.
Proof. We will prove that π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/3. We consider Cases 1 and
2 in turn.
We ﬁrst assume that Case 1 holds, and we let i∗ ∈ I be a player such
that wi∗(nk+1) ≤ mi∗ − .
181. If σi∗(n) = 1 whenever (in,rn) = (i∗,ρi∗), one has by Corollary 6
π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/2.
2. If σi∗(n) = 0 for some n such that (in,rn) = (i∗,ρi∗), then wi∗(n+1) >
mi∗. Observe now that, since payoﬀs are bounded by one, one has
w
i∗(n + 1) ≤ π(n + 1,nk+1) + (1 − π(n + 1,nk+1))w
i∗(nk+1).
By the choice of i∗ one has wi∗(nk+1) ≤ mi∗ − ε, so that
π(n + 1,nk+1) ≥
ε
1 − mi∗ + ε
≥ ε/3.
Since π(nk,nk+1) ≥ π(n + 1,nk+1), the conclusion also follows in that
case.
We next assume that Case 2 holds and we let i∗ ∈ I be the player distin-
guished in the deﬁnition of σ.
1. Assume ﬁrst that σj(n) = 1 for some n and some player j 6= i∗. By
deﬁnition of the proﬁle σ, one then has π(n + 1,nk+1) ≥ ε/2, hence
π(nk,nk+1) ≥ π(n + 1,nk+1) ≥ ε/2.
2. Assume now that σin(n) = 0 whenever in 6= i∗. In that case, wi∗(n) ≤
mi∗ for each n. Indeed, only player i∗ stops, and his payoﬀ is the
average of wi∗(nk+1) ≤ mi∗ and ρ
i∗
i∗ = mi∗. Therefore σi∗(n) = 1
whenever (in,rn) = (i∗,ρi∗), and one gets π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/2, as in Case
1, item 1.
We will now let l vary and we denote by σl and wl the objects that were
deﬁned above. The pure strategy proﬁle σl may be identiﬁed with a point
in {0,1}N (the nth component being the behavior at stage n of the active
player in). Since the product space {0,1}N is compact (and metrizable),
the sequence (σl)l≥0 has a subsequence that converges to some pure strategy
proﬁle σ∗. For notational convenience, we still denote this subsequence by
(σl)l≥0. Since σl is a pure strategy for every l ∈ N, for every ﬁxed n ∈ N the
ﬁrst n components of σ∗ coincide with the ﬁrst n components of σl, provided
l is suﬃciently large. For such l’s, the behavior in the ﬁrst n stages of the
game under the two strategy proﬁles σ∗ and σl coincide.
19Our goal is to prove that σ∗ is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. We ﬁrst
prove that the play terminates Pσ∗-a.s. in each subgame. We will then relate
the payoﬀ γ(σ∗) to the sequence (wl)l∈N (Lemma 11) and prove that no player
has a proﬁtable one-stage deviation (Lemma 12) under σ∗. The conclusion
follows (Proposition 14), after we prove that no single player is responsible
for the termination of the game (Lemma 13).
Corollary 10 For each k ∈ N, one has
Pσ∗(θ < nk+1 | θ ≥ nk) ≥ ε/3.
Proof. Let l > k be large enough so that σ∗ coincides with σl up to stage
nk+1, and apply Lemma 9.




Proof. We prove the result for n = 1. The proof is similar for the
subgame that starts at any stage n ∈ N.
Let k ∈ N be given. For each l ≥ k, one has
γ(σ∗) = Eσ∗[rθ1θ<nk] + Pσ∗(θ ≥ nk)γnk(σ∗), and
wl(1) = Eσl[rθ1θ<nk] + Pσl(θ ≥ nk)wl(nk).
For l large enough, the two proﬁles σl and σ∗ coincide up to stage nk. In
particular, Eσ∗[rθ1θ<nk] = Eσl[rθ1θ<nk] and Pσ∗(θ ≥ nk) = Pσl(θ ≥ nk). By
Corollary 10





provided l is large enough, and the result follows.
The next lemma says in substance that no player can increase his payoﬀ
by more than 3ε by modifying his strategy in a single stage.
Lemma 12 Let n ∈ N be given. The following implications hold.
• If σin









20Proof. Let n ∈ N be given. Let l ∈ N be suﬃciently large so that nl > n.
We ﬁrst prove a related statement for the strategy proﬁle σl. Let k < l be
determined by nk ≤ n < nk+1.
By construction, σ
in
l (n) is deﬁned using backward induction, except in
one case where σ
in
l (n) is required to be zero. In Case 1 one has σ
in




l (n + 1) and σ
in
l (n) = 0 otherwise. In Case 2 one has w
in
l (nk+1) ≥
min − ε and π(n + 1,nk+1) < ε. Therefore, | w
in
l (nk+1) − w
in
l (n + 1) |< 2ε,
which yields w
in
l (n+1) ≥ min −3ε ≥ rin
n −3ε. Hence, in both cases, one has
w
in
l (n + 1) ≤ rin
n if σ
in
l (n) = 1, and
w
in
l (n + 1) ≥ rin
n − 3ε if σ
in
l (n) = 0.
The conclusion follows by taking the limit l → +∞ and using Lemma 11.
We now prove that the play terminates a.s., even if a single player chooses
to continue whenever active. Recall that ci is the strategy of player i that
always continues.
Lemma 13 For every i ∈ I and every n ∈ N, one has
Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1.
Proof. We argue by contradiction, and we assume that, for some player
i ∈ I, the sequence Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) converges to zero when n goes
to +∞. By Corollary 10 the game eventually terminates, so that Pσ∗(θ <
+∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for every n. Therefore, it must be the case that player
i terminates the game: Pσi
∗,c−i(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for every n, and
limn→+∞ kγn(σ∗) − γn(σi
∗,c−i)k = 0.
We ﬁrst prove that limn→+∞ γn(σ∗) = ρi, and then deduce a contradiction
with the basic assumption made on Γ.
Step 1 : The sequence (γi
n(σ∗))n∈N has a limit.
Let n ∈ N be arbitrary. If n ∈ Ni then Lemma 12 implies that γi
n(σ∗) ≥
γi


























21Let ˜ ε ∈ (0,1/40) be given. Choose N˜ ε ∈ N suﬃciently large so that
Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥ N˜ ε) < ˜ ε/2. For such N˜ ε, one has by Corollary 6
P
N˜ ε≤q<+∞;q/ ∈Ni pq1σ
iq





n(σ∗) − 2˜ ε, for every n ≥ m ≥ N˜ ε.
This implies the convergence of (γi
n(σ∗))n∈N, since it is a bounded sequence.
Step 2 : limn→+∞ γn(σ∗) = ρi.
Denote λ := limn→+∞ γn(σ∗). We ﬁrst prove that λi = mi.
Fix δ > 0 suﬃciently small, and take k suﬃciently large so that (i)
|γnk(σ∗) − λ| < δ, (ii) |γnk+1(σ∗) − λ| < δ, and (iii) Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥
nk) < δ.
By Lemma 11 and since σ∗ = liml→+∞ σl, there is l > k suﬃciently large
such that (i) |wl(nk) − λ| < δ, (ii) |wl(nk+1) − λ| < δ, and (iii) Pci,σl(θ <
nk+1 | θ ≥ nk) < δ.
Consider now the block that is played between stages nk and nk+1 under
σl. By (iii), the probability that the game terminates by a player j 6= i is
smaller than δ. Therefore, player i never stops at a stage n such that in = i
and ri
n < λi − 2δ. However, the probability that player i stops at a stage n
such that in = i and ri










i) − 3δ and − δ < m
i − λ
i,
so that −δ < mi − λi < 10δ/ε. As δ is arbitrary, the ﬁrst claim follows.
Hence, limn→+∞ γi
n(σ∗) = mi. This yields limn→+∞ γi
n(σi
∗,c−i) = mi.
Since ρi ∈ RI is the unique vector such that (i,r) ∈ IR and ri = mi,
and since γn(σi
∗,c−i) is in the convex hull of {˜ r : (i, ˜ r) ∈ IR}, one has
limn→+∞ γn(σi
∗,c−i) = ρi. Finally, this implies limn→+∞ γn(σ∗) = ρi.
Step 3 : The contradiction




+∞ | θ ≥ m) < 1 for some m ∈ N, and since π(j, ˜ r) = +∞, there
are inﬁnitely many stages n such that (in,rn) = (j, ˜ r) and σj
∗(n) = 0.





n(σ∗) ≥ ˜ rj. Since ˜ rj > ρ
j
i = limn→+∞ γj
n(σ∗), we get a contra-
diction.
Proposition 14 σ∗ is a subgame-perfect 3ε-equilibrium.
22Proof. Let i ∈ I be given. We prove that player i cannot gain more than
3ε by deviating from σ∗. The same proof will hold in any subgame, thereby
showing the subgame-perfectness property.
Deﬁne the sequence (Xn)n∈N of random variables by Xn = ri
θ if θ < n
and Xn = γi
n(σ∗) if θ ≥ n. Let τi be an arbitrary strategy of player i. By
Lemma 13, the sequence (Xn)n∈N converges Pτi,σ−i




∗ [Xn] = Eτi,σ−i





On the other hand, let n ∈ N, and denote by Hn the past play up to
stage n. We shall prove that
Eτi,σ−i
∗ [Xn+1|Hn] ≤ Xn + 3ε1θ=n,a.s. (10)
On the event θ < n, both Xn and Xn+1 are equal to ri
θ. Consider now the
event θ ≥ n. If in 6= i, one has
Xn = γ
i
n(σ∗) = Eσ∗[Xn+1|Hn] = Eτi,σ−i
∗ [Xn+1|Hn],
where the last equality follows since the two proﬁles (τi,σ−i
∗ ) and σ∗ coincide
at stage n. In both cases, (10) follows trivially. Finally, if in = i, one has
Xn = Xn+1 = γi
n+1(σ∗) if σin
∗ (n) = 0 and Eτi,σ−i
∗ [Xn+1|Hn] = pnri
n + (1 −
pn)γi
n+1(σ∗) otherwise. Inequality (10) then follows by Lemma 12.
By taking expectations in (10), and by summing over n, one obtains
limn→+∞ Eτi,σ−i





∗ ) ≤ γ
i(σ∗) + 3ε.
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